Everyone will know why, but everyone takes it for granted that it is not one of the most common ceremonial visits. As in many other commanders who have been governing for many years, although Putin and Xi will be in front for the eleventh time, the visit to Moscow by the top Chinese leader for two or three days has something special. Some believe that the main explanation would be the anguish Putin would suffer during the Ukrainian war. For others, at least in the same vein, it would be something to look at with the prism of the peace plan that China has recently raised.

Confirming that the world, and its main vicissitudes, can be something beyond Europe or the West, can help raise cognitive gain. Therefore, although the crisis in Ukraine is sure to be on the table, many different issues will be addressed in Moscow. Among other things, a dozen agreements will be signed between the two parties during these days. After a long time of negotiation. Those related to the economy, for the most part, but also to other areas. And some will not be made public entirely.

Indeed, the real peculiarity of the visit, beyond the extraordinary speed and simplicity that has been applied to the agenda of the ‘state visit’, would be the pride that has previously been given to it by the Chinese. Very unusual: all official and para-official media have attended the meeting.

Signal that the agreements are agreed. But also, unlike the crucial summits held between Mao and Stalin in 1949-50, between Mao and Khrustxov in 1958-59, and between Deng and Gorbatxov in 1989, this would mean that the Chinese party is satisfied and satisfied.

At the moment, the first diplomatic responsibility of Beijing's power is to face the "economic war" they expect from the United States. Working on own resources to the end and linking short-chain alliances, at least in three main areas: energy, food and technology. In the first two, Russia’s contribution can be decisive, and it would not be as easy to break an alliance as in other times.

In the same vein, the sessions of Moscow, XX. The structure of the Chinese external relations working group reorganized after the congress must emerge. Xi's composition may be clearer than public and communicated demonstrations.

It will therefore be nothing or party.